DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS 

 
Application for the Correction of 
the Coast Guard Record of: 
 
                                                                                BCMR Docket No. 2004-177 
 
  
   

 

 
 

FINAL DECISION 

 
Author:  Ulmer, D. 
 
 
This  proceeding  was  conducted  according  to  the  provisions  of  section  1552  of 
title  10  and  section  425  of  title  14  of  the  United  States  Code.    The  application  was 
docketed on August 25, 2004, upon receipt of the applicant’s completed application and 
military records. 
 
 
members who were designated to serve as the Board in this case. 
 

This  final  decision,  dated  May  5,  2005,  is  signed  by  the  three  duly  appointed 

APPLICANT’S REQUEST 

 
 
 The  applicant  asked  the  Board  to  correct  her  military  record  to  show  that  she 
was  discharged  from  the  Coast  Guard  by  reason  of  physical  disability  with  a  100% 
disability rating due to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), rather than having been 
discharged by reason of unsuitability due to personality disorder.  In December 2002, 
the  applicant  was  assigned  a  70%  disability  rating  from  the  Department  of  Veterans 
Affairs for PTSD, which was increased to a 100% because she was unable to work due 
to her service connected disability/disabilities.   
 

The applicant, who had previous Army service, enlisted in the Coast Guard on 
April 15, 1985.   She completed indoctrination for prior service members on May 9, 1985.  
Shortly thereafter, she was assigned to duty at a United States Coast Guard Station in 
Florida.  She was honorably discharged on January 15, 1986, by reason of unsuitability, 
with  a  JMB  (personality  disorder)  separation  code,  and  with  a  RE-4  (ineligible  for 
reenlistment)  reenlistment  code.    When  discharged,  she  had  served  nine  months  and 
one day on active duty in the Coast Guard.   

 

APPLICANT’S ALLEGATIONS 

 
The applicant alleged that her discharge by reason of unsuitability was erroneous 
 
and unjust.  She asserted that she suffered from PTSD that was incurred while she was 
on  active  duty.    She  stated  that  she  was  given  the  unsuitability/personality  disorder 
discharge because her military psychiatrist determined that she was "unable to conform 
to military ways of thinking and living."   She alleged that she was unable to conform to 
the military because she had been raped in the Army and suffered sexual harassment 
while in the Coast Guard.  In this regard she stated the following: 
 

I could not believe that after being raped in the Army, that I had crossed 
over  to  another  branch  of  the  service  where  the  men  were  constantly 
coming  into  my  sleeping  area  in  the  middle  of  the  night,  trying  to  have 
non-consensual  sex  with  me.    And  one  other  thing  that  I  just  could  not 
conform  to,  (and  this  is  only  an  example  of  the  many  other  things  that 
made, makes, and will continue to make, my life a living hell) was going 
out on night training with the kind of men who thought it was amusing to 
throw,  fish  bait  (chum)  into  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  trying  to  attract  sharks, 
and at the same time, holding me upside down by my legs, dangling me 
over the bloody chum . . .   

 
 
The applicant further alleged that she received poor medical care amounting to 
medical  malpractice  while in the Coast Guard.  She  stated that she should have been 
provided with a doctor who could have  spent more time analyzing her situation and 
traumatic  experiences.    She  stated  that  she  did  not  have  an  opportunity  for  a  second 
opinion with respect to her mental evaluation and that she had no say in the matter of 
her discharge.   
 

SUMMARY OF THE RECORD 

 
 
The applicant enlisted in the Coast Guard on April 15, 1985.  Neither her October 
17,  1984  enlistment  medical  evaluation  nor  her  April  16,  1985  pre-training  medical 
evaluation contained any evidence that the applicant was in anything but good health.  
Both  times  she  rated  her  health  as  good  and  stated  that  she  was  not  taking  any 
medications.  
 
 
On October 23, 1985, the applicant was diagnosed with an adjustment reaction 
with  mixed  emotion  features  and  suicidal  ideation.    The  medical  note  stated  that  the 
applicant had problems with her work schedule and stated that she could not handle 
the 24-hour duty and that she was afraid of the boats and water.  The medical note also 
indicated that the applicant had taken four Halcion pills. The doctor recommended that 

the  applicant  be  hospitalized  and  that  she  be  evaluated  for  continuation  in  the  Coast 
Guard.   
 
On October 25, 1985, the applicant was admitted to an Air Force military hospital 
 
for  evaluation  of  an  overdose  of  Halcion.    In  the  admission  summary,  the  evaluation 
noted  that  the  applicant  had  stated  to  the  referring  physician  that  she  was  afraid  of 
boats and water, but that her CO stated that the applicant's record showed adequate job 
performance.  The summary stated that the applicant denied suicidal ideation when she 
took  the  four  Halcion  pills  in  one  evening.    The  summary  further  stated  that  the 
applicant did not relate any affective disorders, psychotic disorders, or substance abuse 
disorders.   
 
 
On October 30, 1985, a Certificate of Psychiatric Evaluation was prepared.  The 
 
report  stated  that  the applicant  had  encountered  job  difficulties  for  the  six  months  of 
active  duty  and  that  she  was  completely  dissatisfied  with  the  description  of  her  job 
duties and her inability to be able to be trained into aviational electronics.  (Apparently 
this  is  what  she  did  in  the  Army.    She  was  unable  to  train  in  this  area  in  the  Coast 
Guard because she did not score high enough on the pertinent tests.)   The physician 
stated that from the very first the applicant let it be known that she wanted out of the 
Coast  Guard  and  that  she  would  not  perform  in  any  meaningful  way  for  the  Coast 
Guard in the future.  With respect to her mental evaluation, he wrote the following: 
 

There  was  no  evidence  of  any  signs  of  depression  on  mental  status 
evaluation, mood was not depressed, affect  showed a normal range and 
modulation  becoming  tearful  only  when  presented  with  the  possibility 
that her discharge might not be as timely as she wished.  There were no 
neurovegetative  signs  sufficient 
to  warrant  DSM-III  diagnosis  of 
depression.  At the same time, she seems to have relatively realistic goals 
for herself and plans for the future.  It is the undersigned's opinion that 
she  has  been  so  explicit  in  her  statement  about  her  unwillingness  to 
perform  for  the  Coast  Guard  that  keeping  her  within  the  service  would 
probably not be in the best interest of the patient or the Unites States Coast 
Guard.   

 
 
The  psychiatrist  diagnosed  the  applicant  as  having  an  immature  atypical 
personality  disorder.    He  also  diagnosed  that  she  had  the  following  psychological 
stressors:    chronic  job  performance  difficulties,  difficulty  with  job  supervisor,  and  an 
impending  separation  from  her  fiancé.    The  psychiatrist  found  that  the  applicant 
suffered from no mental disease or defect and that she was mentally responsible for her 
behavior and possessed the mental capacity to understand and cooperate intelligently 
as a respondent in any administrative proceeding.    However, he stated that she was 
temperamentally  and  emotionally  unsuited  for  continued  service  in  the  United  States 

Coast Guard. Therefore, he recommended her prompt administrative separation from 
the Coast Guard.  
  
The  applicant  was  advised  by  her  commanding  officer  (CO)  that  the  CO  had 
 
initiated  action  to  discharge  her  from  the  Coast  Guard  due  to  a  personality  disorder.  
The  applicant  was  advised  that  she  could  write  a  statement  in  her  own  behalf.    The 
applicant acknowledged notification of the proposed discharge and indicated that she 
would make a statement.  On November 18, 1985, the applicant submitted a statement 
asking to be discharged.  She stated, "I desperately need to be discharged from the Coat 
Guard as soon as possible." 
 
 
On  November  15,  1985,  the  applicant's  CO  asked  the  Commandant  for 
permission to discharge the applicant by reason of personality disorder.  He stated that 
the applicant had had problems adjusting to her assignment since reporting on May 20, 
1985, and that she had complained frequently about the menial tasks she was required 
to perform as a seaman.  He further stated the following: 
 

[The  applicant]  volunteered  for  and  received  a  quota  for  EMT  training 
which  she  dropped  out  of  after  a  few  classes.    She  stated  a  desire  to 
mutual to ATC Mobile, only to change her mind after the OIC had set it 
up.  She made unsubstantiated charges that the woman petty officer of the 
section  worked  her  too  hard.    She  consistently  reacted  to  criticism, 
regardless of delivery, with tears and emotional outpourings.  She refused 
to go on a SAR [search and rescue] mission until after the OIC intervened. 
She was counseled on numerous occasions by supervisors, the XPO, and 
the OIC on career enhancement, performance, and attitude to no avail.   

 
 
The CO noted that the applicant had been admitted and discharged from an Air 
Force hospital.  Upon reporting to her unit after being discharged from the hospital, the 
CO  stated  that  the  applicant  told  her  OIC  that  she  was  contemplating  suicide,  after 
which she was returned to the hospital where she remained until her discharge.   
 
 
On November 25, 1985, the applicant signed an administrative remarks (page 7) 
page acknowledging that she could consult with an attorney regarding the implication 
of her possible discharge.  By her signature, she stated that she did not wish to speak 
with an attorney. 
 

On December 13, 1985, the Commandant approved the request to discharge her 

from the Coast Guard by reason of unsuitability with a JMB separation code.  

 
On January 13, 1986, the applicant underwent a separation medical examination, 

where her personality disorder was noted, but she was found fit for separation. 

 

The applicant was discharged on January 15, 1986. 

On January 14, 1986,  the applicant signed a statement indicating that she agreed 
with the findings of the physical examination given to her on January 13, 1986, and did 
not desire to submit a statement in rebuttal.   
 
 
 
Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) Records 
 
 
On  January  21,  1994,  approximately  eight  years  after  her  discharge  from  the 
Coast Guard, the applicant filed a claim with the DVA for disability compensation.  The 
DVA ordered a mental examination, which diagnosed the applicant as having a bi-polar 
disorder  and  compulsive/obsessive  traits.      The  psychiatric  report  indicated  that  the 
applicant  had  transferred  from  the  Army  to  the  Coast  Guard  because  she  had  been 
raped  while  in  the  Army.    According  the  report,  the  applicant  had  done  well  in  the 
Coast Guard until she was ordered to attend an Emergency Medical Technician School 
for law enforcement and search and rescue.  The report stated that the applicant did not 
want to attend the course because the sight of suffering, blood, and pain repulsed her, 
but her commander ordered her to attend the school.  The report further stated: 
 

While attending this school, she was called out one night in July 1986 to a 
boating accident where a boater who had gotten quite drunk, rammed his 
motor board against the dock and incurred very severe head injuries and 
quite possibly a neck dislocation.  She came on the scene and did what she 
could  to  help  the  man,  even  though  she  was  very  upset  by  the  sight  of 
much trauma -- the man's nose had been pushed deeply into his skull and 
he was not only bleeding from the nose but spinal fluid also was dripping 
from his nose and he was very badly hurt and died in the hospital.  This 
troubled her a great deal.  In addition, for some unknown reason, the local 
paper, the News Herald of Panama City, Florida, came out with a kind of 
editorial saying that the Coast Guard technicians were very poorly trained 
and  that  the  technician  who  took  care  of  this  boating  accident  was  in  a 
way responsible for boater's death.  This troubled the veteran a great deal, 
adding  to  her  concern  about  the  actual  accident  and  the  effect  on  her.  
From then on, she began to have an alternating mood disorder.    

 
 
On July 11, 1994, the DVA denied the applicant's claim stating that a personality 
disorder is not a disability for which compensation can be granted.  With respect to the 
applicant's  diagnosed  bi-polar  disorder,  the  DVA  stated  that  "There  are  no  medical 
findings  to  establish  that  the  currently  diagnosed  bipolar  disorder  was  incurred  in 
service or manifested to a degree of 10% within the year after discharge."   
 
 
In  August  2000,  the  applicant  requested  that  the  DVA  reopen  her  claim  and 
consider  granting  her  a  service-connected  disability  for  PTSD  based  on  the  boating 

incident, which took place on July 21, 1985.1  On April 21, 2001, the DVA granted the 
applicant a 10% disability rating for PTSD dating back to August 21, 2000.  The rating 
decision  stated  that  a  10%  evaluation  is  granted  whenever  there  is  occupational  and 
social impairment due to mild or transient symptoms that decrease work efficiency and 
ability to perform occupational tasks only during periods of significant stress or when 
symptoms are controlled by continuous medication.   
 
 
The applicant appealed the 2001 disability rating, and on May 13, 2002, the DVA 
increased the applicant's disability rating to 50%.  On December 20, 2002, the applicant's 
disability  rating  was  increased  to  70%  but  she  was  granted  100% entitlement  because 
she was unable to work due to her disabilities. 
 

 

VIEWS OF THE COAST GUARD 

 

 
On January 12, 2005, the Board received an advisory opinion from the Office of 
the Judge Advocate General (JAG).  He recommended that the applicant's request for 
relief be denied because it was untimely and for lack of proof of error or injustice.  
 
  
The JAG argued that the applicant has failed to show by a preponderance of the 
evidence why it is in the interest of justice to excuse her eighteen-year delay in filing an 
application with the Board within three years of her discharge from the Coast Guard.  
He stated that absent strong evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that Coast Guard 
officials carried out their duties lawfully, correctly, and in good faith.  Arens v. United 
States, 969 F. 2d 1034, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1990).   He stated that the applicant has failed to 
meet her burden of proving error.  He argued that the record actually shows that the 
Coast  Guard  acted  properly  and  in  accordance  with  established  procedures  in 
discharging the applicant as it did.  
  
 
The JAG argued that the only evidence submitted by the applicant to support her 
allegation that the Coast Guard committed an error in evaluating her condition is the 
2001 DVA rating granting her a service connected disability for PTSD.  The JAG noted 
that  the  DVA  findings  regarding  the  applicant’s  disabilities  have  no  bearing  or  legal 
effect  on  the  Coast  Guard’s  medical  findings.    In  this  regard,  the  JAG  stated  that  the 
DVA determines to what extent a veteran’s civilian earning capacity has been reduced 
as a result of physical disabilities.  In contrast, the Coast Guard determines if a member 
is  unfit  to  perform  her  military  duties  and  then  rates  the  extent the  unfitting  medical 
condition  prevents  the  member  from  performing  her  duties.    He  further  stated  as 
follows: 
 

The  procedures  and  presumptions  applicable  to  the  DVA  evaluation 
process  are  fundamentally  different  from,  and  more  favorable  to  the 

                                                 
1   There is no documentation of this event in the military record. 

veteran  than,  those  applied  under  the  PDES  (Coast  Guard’s  Physical 
Disability  Evaluation  System).    The  DVA  is  not  limited  to  the  time  of 
Applicant’s  discharge.    If  a  service-connected  condition  later  becomes 
disabling, the DVA may award compensation on that basis.   The DVA's 
finding that the applicant is currently severely disabled is not relevant to 
the  Coast  Guard's  finding  that  she  was  not  disabled  at  the  time  of  her 
discharge from the Coast Guard in 1986.  The sole standard for a disability 
determination in the Coast Guard is unfitness to perform duty    . . . In any 
event  any  long-term  diminution  in  the  Applicant's  earning  capacity 
attributable to his military service is properly a matter of the DVA, not the 
Coast Guard or the BCMR.   

 
 
The  JAG  attached  comments  from  the  Commander,  Coast  Guard  Personnel 
Command  (CGPC)  as  Enclosure  (1)  to  the  advisory  opinion.      CGPC  stated  that  the 
applicant's  diagnosed  personality  disorder  is  not  a  basis  for  a  physical  disability 
separation, but may be a basis for an administrative separation.  CGPC stated that there 
was no basis at the time of the applicant's discharge for a medical separation, and there 
was  no  information  of  the  alleged  attempted  rape  or  sexual  harassment  prior  to  or 
immediately afterward her discharge.   He noted that prior to 1994 the applicant made 
no  mention  of  any  traumatic  experiences  in  the  Coast  Guard.    CGPC  stated  that 
contrary  to  the  applicant's  assertion  that  her  traumatic  state  prevented  her  from 
obtaining  sustainable  employment,  the  DVA  record  contains  information  suggesting 
the  applicant  "worked  as  a  receptionist  at  a  fashion  design  company  for  three  years" 
after her discharge.  The DVA record also contains information that the applicant stated 
that she stopped working when she got married in 1992.   
 
 
CGPC  stated  that  no  evidence  exists  to  suggest  that  the  applicant's  condition 
warranted introduction into the physical disability evaluation system at the time of her 
separation.      He  asserted  that  she  received  the  proper  psychological  attention  and 
completed  an  additional  separation  physical  evaluation  to  confirm  her  physical 
qualification  for  separation.    He  also  stated  that  the  applicant  stated  that  she  did  not 
wish  to  consult  an  attorney  about  her  pending  discharge,  and  the  only  statement  she 
offered  was  "I  desperately  need  to  be  discharged  from  the  Coast  Guard  as  soon  as 
possible." 
 

APPLICANT’S RESPONSE TO THE VIEWS OF THE COAST GUARD 

 
 
On February 2, 2005, the BCMR received the applicant's reply to the views of the 
Coast Guard.  She disagreed with the comments in the advisory opinion.  The applicant 
denied that she ever volunteered for EMT training or that she worked for three years at 
a fashion design company.  She stated that she only worked at the design company for 
seven months.  She stated that due to the worsening of her PTSD symptoms, she had to 
stop  working  as  a  stripper  when  she  became  married.    She  also  stated  that  the 

increasing  severity  of  the  PTSD  symptoms  led  to  the  failure  of  her  marriage.    The 
applicant  stated  that  she  did  not  share  the  truth  about  her  alleged  rape  and  sexual 
harassment because she was intimidated and ashamed. 
 
 
With respect to the untimeliness of her application, she stated that the injustice 
occurred  in  1986,  but  she  did  not  realize  that  she  had  suffered  an  injustice  until  2004 
while being interviewed at the DVA.  She stated that the 1986 date on her application 
for discovery of the alleged error in her record is a mistake.    She stated that due to the 
trauma,  intimidation,  and  shame  she  did  not  know  what  her  rights  were  before  her 
discharge.   
 

APPLICABLE LAW 

Disability Statutes 
 
 
Title 10 U.S.C. § 1201 provides that a member who is found to be “unfit to per-
form the duties of the member’s office, grade, rank, or rating because of physical dis-
ability incurred while entitled to basic pay” may be retired if the disability is (1) perma-
nent and stable, (2) not a result of misconduct, and (3) for members with less than 20 
years of service, “at least 30 percent under the standard schedule of rating disabilities in 
use by the Department of Veterans Affairs at the time of the determination.”  Title 10 
U.S.C.  § 1203  provides  that  such  a  member  whose  disability  is  rated  at  only  10  or  20 
percent  under  the  VASRD  shall  be  discharged  with  severance  pay.    Title  10  U.S.C. 
§ 1214  states  that  “[n]o  member  of  the  armed  forces  may  be  retired  or  separated  for 
physical disability without a full and fair hearing if he demands it.” 
 
Physical Disability Evaluation System (PDES)  Manual (COMDTINST M1850.2C) 
 
 
Article 2.C.2a. states that the sole standard in making determinations of physical 
disability as a basis for retirement or separation shall be unfitness to perform the duties 
of  office,  grade,  rank  or  rating  because  of  disease  or  injury  incurred  or  aggravated 
through  military  service.    Each  case  is  to  be  considered  by  relating  the  nature  and 
degree of physical disability of the evaluee  concerned to the requirements and duties 
that a member may reasonably be expected to perform in his or her office, grade, rank 
or rating.   
 
 
Article  2.C.2.i  states  in  pertinent  part  that  although  "a  member  may  have 
physical impairment ratable in accordance with the VASRD, such impairments do not 
necessarily render him or her unfit for military duty." 
 
 
 
Personnel Manual (COMDTINST M1000.6A) 
 

Article 12.B.16 of the Personnel Manual lists unsuitability (personality disorder) 

 
as a basis discharge.    

Medical Manual (COMDTINST M6000.1B)   
 
 
Chapter  5.B.2.  lists  the  following  as  personality  disorders:    Paranoid,  Schizoid, 
Schizotypal,  Obsessive  Compulsive,  Histrionic,  Dependent,  Antisocial,  Narcissistic, 
Avoidant, Borderline, and Personality disorder NOS (includes Passive-aggressive).  
 

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 

1.  The Board has jurisdiction concerning this matter pursuant to section 1552 of 

 
 
The  Board  makes  the  following  findings  and  conclusions  on  the  basis  of  the 
applicant's  military  record  and  submissions,  the  Coast  Guard's  submissions,  and 
applicable law: 
 
 
title 10 of the United States Code.  
 
 
2.  The application was not timely.   To be timely, an application for correction of 
a military record must be submitted within three years after the applicant discovered or 
should  have  discovered  the  alleged  error  or  injustice.    See  33  CFR  52.22.      This 
application was submitted approximately fifteen years beyond the statute of limitations.   
 
3.  The Board may still consider the application on the merits, however, if it finds 
 
it is in the interest of justice to do so.  The interest of justice is determined by taking into 
consideration the reasons for and the length of the delay and the likelihood of success 
on the merits of the claim. See Dickson v. Secretary of Defense, 68 F.3d 1396, 1405 (D.C. 
Cir. 1995); Allen v. Card, 799 F. Supp. 158, 164 (D.D.C. 1992).   The applicant claimed 
that  she  did  not  discover  the  alleged  error  until  2004.    However,  she  should  have 
discovered  it  at  the  time  of  her  discharge.    The  applicant  knew  that  she  was  being 
discharged  due  to  a  personality  disorder.    She  received  notification  of  the  discharge, 
wrote a statement in her own behalf, and waived her right to speak with an attorney.  
Although she currently states that because of the trauma, intimidation, and shame she 
allegedly  suffered  in  the  Coast  Guard,  she  was  not  aware  of  any  of  her  rights,  the 
psychiatrist wrote in late 1985 that she did not have a mental illness and that she was 
mentally  responsible  for  her  behavior  and  possessed  sufficient  mental  capacity  to 
understand and cooperate intelligently in any administrative proceeding.  In addition, 
eight  years  had  elapsed  between  the  applicant's  discharge  and  her  first  DVA 
examination in 1994 in which she was diagnosed with a bi-polar disorder Even though 
she was diagnosed with the mental disorder in 1994, the medical examination did not 
state that she was mentally incompetent to handle her own affairs then or in 1986.   The 
applicant's reason for not filing her application sooner is not persuasive. 
 

4.  With respect to the merits of the case, the Board finds that the applicant is not 
likely to prevail on them.  The applicant has submitted insufficient evidence to prove 
that  the  Coast  Guard  committed  an  error  or  injustice  by  discharging  her  due  to  a 
personality  disorder  rather  than  due  to  a  physical  disability.    The  applicant  was 
diagnosed as suffering from a personality disorder in late 1985 and made no mention of 
any traumatic events suffered in the Coast Guard or the Army at or prior to that time.  
She stated on her discharge examination form that she was in good health and taking 
no medications.  Moreover, when given the opportunity to write a statement about her 
discharge, she made it known that she wanted to be discharged as soon as possible. The 
psychiatrist who diagnosed the applicant's personality disorder stated that he found no 
evidence  of  "mental  defect,  emotional  illness  or  psychiatric  disorder."    The  Board  is 
satisfied  that  at  the  time  of  her  discharge,  the  applicant  did  not  suffer  from  a  mental 
disability.   

 
5.  In addition, Article 2.C.2.b. of the PDES Manual states, "The law that provides 
for disability . . .  separation . . . is designed to compensate a member whose  military 
service is terminated due to a physical disability that has rendered him or her unfit for 
continued duty."  Article 2.C.2.a. states that the sole standard in making determinations 
of physical disability as a basis for retirement or separation shall be unfitness to perform 
the duties of one's rank or rating. The applicant has not presented persuasive evidence 
that she was unfit to perform her duties at the time of her discharge due to a physical 
disability.  The 2001 diagnosis for PTSD is not proof that she was unfit for duty in 1986.  
Her PTSD symptoms could have begun during the fifteen years that elapsed between 
her discharge and PTSD diagnosis. The Board notes that the DVA did not diagnose the 
applicant  with  PTSD  until  2001  and  made  the  rating  retroactive  only  to  August  2000, 
not to 1986.  

 
6.  The applicant asserted that a rape in while in the Army, sexual harassment 
while  in  the  Coast  Guard,  and  witnessing  and  failing  to  save  a  fatally  ill  individual 
while in the Coast Guard caused her PTSD.  Even assuming she was exposed to these 
events, she still has not established that she actually suffered from PTSD while she was 
on  active  duty.    The  1985  psychiatric  examination  was  contemporaneous  with  the 
applicant's discharge and is much more reliable as to the applicant's mental state at that 
time.  It revealed that the applicant did not suffer from any mental disease or defect, but 
suffered from an atypical personality, which is not a physical disability under Article 
2.A.7. of the Physical Disability Evaluations System Manual. 

 
 
7.  Moreover, the applicant noted on her discharge medical examination that she 
was  in  good  health  and  taking  no  medications.    On  January  14,  1986,  the  applicant 
signed an entry stating that she agreed with the findings of the  physical examination 
given  to  her on  January  13,  1986,  and  did  not  desire to  make  a  statement  in  rebuttal.  
The  Board  is  persuaded  by  the  October  31,  1985,  psychiatric  evaluation  that  the 
applicant understood her actions at the time she executed these documents   

 

8.    Neither  the  applicant's  1994  DVA  bi-polar  diagnosis  nor  the  2001  PTSD 
diagnosis proves that the Coast Guard's 1985 diagnosis that the applicant did not have a 
mental disease or defect to be in error.  In Lord v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 749, 754 (1983), 
the  Court  of  Federal  Claims  recognized  the  differences  between  the  DVA  and  the 
Armed  Forces  disability  systems.    The  Court  stated,  "The  Veterans  Administration 
determines to what extent a veteran's earning capacity has been reduced as a result of 
specific injuries or combination of injuries.  [Citation omitted.]  The Armed Forces, on 
the other hand, determine to what extent a member has been rendered unfit to perform 
the duties of his office, grade, rank, or rating because of a physical disability. [Citation 
omitted.]  Accordingly, Veterans' Administration ratings are not determinative of issues 
involved in military disability retirement cases."  Since the applicant's PTSD symptoms 
were manifested well after her discharge from the Coast Guard, the matter should be 
handled by the DVA.  
 

9.    The  applicant  received  all  due  process  to  which  she  was  entitled  under  the 
Coast Guard Personnel Manual and has failed to prove that the Coast Guard committed 
an error or injustice in her case.  

 
10. 

  Her  allegation  that  she  was  the  victim  of  medical  malpractice  is 

unsubstantiated.   
 

11.   Accordingly, due to the length of the delay, the unpersuasive reason for not 
filing her application sooner, and the probable lack of success on the merits of her claim, 
the Board finds that it is not in the interest of justice to waive the statute of limitations in 
this case, and it should be denied because it is untimely.   

 

 
 
 

 
 
 
 

[ORDER AND SIGNATURES ON FOLLOWING PAGE] 

The  application  of  ____________________  USCG,  for  correction  of  her 

ORDER 

 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

military record is denied.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 

 
 
 

 
 

 
 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 
 

        

 
 Quang D. Nguyen 

 

 

 
 Dorothy J. Ulmer 

 

 

 
 
 Eric J. Young